Quick commerce: Blinkit, Zepto, Swiggy Instamart, BigBasket BB Now. Collectively burning hundreds of crores monthly. Delivering groceries faster than most countries can book a doctor's appointment. The business model: lose money on every order until you have enough orders that losing money on each one becomes an irrelevance. Economists call this "scale." Kirana owners call it "unfair." The onion has no opinion. The onion arrives in 10 minutes.

By Pappu Sharma, Breaking Bakwas Business Desk  |  BreakingBakwas.com

INDIA — The quick commerce industry has accomplished something genuinely remarkable: it has made the Indian consumer's demand for convenience completely real while simultaneously making the economic sustainability of that convenience completely theoretical. You can get tomatoes in 8 minutes. The tomatoes arrive on a bicycle powered by a delivery partner earning piece-rate income with no employment benefits, dispatched from a "dark store" — a warehouse in a dense urban area that stocks 5,000 SKUs of groceries and runs 24 hours and pays rent in the most expensive residential zones of Bengaluru and Delhi — managed by an operations team that optimises delivery speed at a cost per order that exceeds the platform fee per order in most scenarios, making each tomato you receive a tomato that the platform delivered at a loss, funded by investor capital that was raised with the thesis that eventually there will be enough tomatoes to fund the tomatoes.

Blinkit — formerly Grofers, which is one of the great startup rebrand stories, the name change from "Grofers" to "Blinkit" being the clearest possible signal that the company knew "Grofers" was not a name anyone wanted to say out loud — is owned by Zomato and loses significant money per quarter while growing its GMV rapidly. Swiggy Instamart contributed to Swiggy's ₹1,730 crore loss in the first nine months of FY25. Zepto, the poster child of the category, raised $1 billion in 2024 on a $5 billion valuation and is valued higher than some actual profitable companies that make actual things, on the basis that eventually Zepto's dark stores will be profitable, which they will be when the average order value grows, which it will when customers buy more per order, which they will when the product range expands, which has already happened, which has not yet made the dark stores profitable. The thesis is internally consistent. The timeline is optimistic. The onions arrive.

"We're building the infrastructure for India's digital grocery future."— Every quick commerce founder, at every investor meeting, between 2021 and 2026. The infrastructure is being built. The infrastructure costs a great deal to build. The infrastructure is partially funded by delivering tomatoes at a loss to people who could have walked to the kirana three buildings away but chose not to because there is a platform that delivers tomatoes in 8 minutes and the 8 minutes has become psychologically necessary in a way that pre-2020 tomato purchasing had not prepared any of us for.

The kirana crisis is real and documented. Traditional kirana stores have reported 15-25% revenue declines in areas well-served by quick commerce platforms. The kirana owner — who employs no dark store, no warehouse management system, no delivery algorithm, no venture capital — competes against an operation that is functionally subsidised by investors betting on a future where the subsidy disappears. The kirana cannot compete on delivery speed. The kirana cannot compete on app experience. The kirana can compete on credit — the "khata" system, where regular customers pay at the end of the month — which no quick commerce platform has yet replicated at scale because credit requires trust and trust requires knowing your customer, which requires the kirana owner's thirty years of operating from the same corner, which the dark store does not have and cannot buy.

Zepto's founders — Aadit Palicha (Stanford dropout) and Kaivalya Vohra (Harvard dropout) — are 22 and 21 years old respectively and run a company valued at $5 billion. They are, by any measure, genuinely impressive. They built something real, scaled it fast, made good operational decisions, and raised money from serious global investors. They also built it on a model that loses money on every delivery with the conviction that scale will fix the unit economics, which is a conviction that has been correct for some platforms (Zomato eventually turned profitable) and wrong for many others (every grocery delivery service that shut down between 2018 and 2023). Which outcome Zepto reaches depends on whether it can grow average order value to ₹600+ where platform economics improve, whether it can expand the product range into high-margin private label goods, and whether the delivery partner workforce — who are the actual infrastructure, on bicycles, at 11 PM, for a piece rate — can be retained at a cost that the model can absorb. These are real challenges with uncertain outcomes. The tomatoes arrive in 8 minutes. The outcome arrives when it arrives. The kirana is still open at the corner. He watches. He has seen many things. He has been there longer than Blinkit. He may be there longer after.

Quick CommerceBlinkit Zepto SwiggyLoss Per TomatoDark Store EconomicsKirana Crisis8 Minute DeliveryStanford Harvard Dropouts
Disclaimer: Satire. Swiggy's ₹1,730 crore loss is from Q1-Q3 FY25 filings. Zepto's $5B valuation and $1B raise are documented. The 15-25% kirana revenue decline is from industry surveys. The delivery partner's 11 PM bicycle ride is real and undercompensated. — Ed.